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popular initiatives in particular in the State of California seems to provide conclusive evidence for all 
of these shortcomings. Due to its constitutional arrangement and its diverse structure, Switzerland – 
which historically served as a blueprint for introducing instruments of direct democracy at the state-
level during the progressive area in the United States – offers a unique case to assess these claims: 
More than half of the world’s referenda held at the national level during the 20th century have taken 
place in Switzerland. At the same time, the Swiss Federal Constitution provides for limited 
constitutional review only, excluding Federal statutes and international law from judicial control. 
Based on the lessons from the Swiss experience, this paper argues not only for a more realistic 
approach to popular decision-making but for a more differentiated understanding of the general term 
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I.  The Swiss Puzzle 
Popular decision-making by institutions of direct democracy has been the object of fierce 
criticism. In a tradition rooted in Plato’s elitist skepticism of democracy,1 Joseph A. Schumpeter 
coined the phrase that direct democracy might work in Switzerland, as “[t]here is so little to 
quarrel about in a world of peasants which, excepting hotels and banks, contains no great 
capitalist industry, and the problems of public policy are so simple and so stable that an 
overwhelming majority can be expected to understand them and to agree about them”, but fails to 
deliver sound solutions for more complex, industrialized societies asking for “great decisions”.2 
Along the lines established by Max Weber,3 rejection of institutions of direct democracy seems to 
be particularly widespread in mainstream German legal academic circles where plebiscites are 
still associated with the collapse of the Weimar Republic.4 The Grundgesetz, consequently, does 
not, at least according to the prevailing opinion, allow for direct-democratic decision-making at 
the national level.5 Peter Krause, writing in the leading Handbuch des Staatsrechts der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, even claims that direct democracy does “not lead to acceptance or 
stability (…), rather, it goes against the general welfare, and leads to irrationality, inconsistency, 
and punctuality.” It would not only fail to “promote the disimpassioned and objective decision-
                                                 
1
  PLATO, REPUBLIC 285-91 (Reginald E. Allen, trans., Yale University Press 2006) (approx. 360 B.C.E.). See 
also Gerasimos Santas, Plato’s Criticisms of Democracy in the Republic, 24 Social Philosophy and Policy 70 (2007). 
2
  JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 267 (2nd ed. 1947).  
3
  E.g. MAX WEBER, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 666 (5rd ed. 1921-25/72): “[D]ie Überprüfung der Beschlüsse 
der Parlamente durch das ‘Referendum’ bedeutet in der Hauptsache eine wesentliche Stärkung aller irrationalen 
Mächte des Beharrens (...).“ 
4
  See e.g. Hans Schneider, Die Reichsverfassung vom 11. August 1919 § 5 N. 56 in HANDBUCH DES 
STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND. BAND II (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 3rd ed. 2003) 
(arguing that referenda offered “political demagogy … a romping place” instead of serving the cause of “political 
education of the people.” – Translation by the author.)  
5
  The prevailing opinion usually relies on a structural argument based on GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 29 and 
GG art. 118/118a. GG art. 20 § 2 (second sentence), thus, is to be read only as a commitment to popular sovereignty 
as such. 
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making”, but “impedes the ordinary citizen from fulfilling his other responsibilities.”6 Similar 
criticism origins from the late Hans Huber, a influential figure in Swiss legal academia for 
several decades, who argued that popular initiatives would “distract” the political branches and 
the administration from “more important and more pressing tasks” leaving them to be 
preoccupied with “the defense against demagogy and impracticability”7. The core of the 
argument was coined by Giovanni Sartori who argued that not only would direct democracy 
“quickly and disastrously founder on the reefs of cognitive incompetence”, but it would 
inevitably lead to a “zero-sum mechanism”, extremism, and “majority tyranny”.8 It appears that 
direct democracy aggravates an inherent peril of democracy observed by James Madison, namely 
“that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the 
minor party; but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.”9 
Against this backdrop, the case of Switzerland provides some puzzling insights. More 
than half of all the referenda held worldwide at the national level between 1900 and 1993 – 
52 percent – took place in Switzerland10, whereas the Swiss Federal Constitution provides for 
limited constitutional review only, excluding Federal statutes and international law from judicial 
control.11 Furthermore, Switzerland seems to be particularly exposed to the threats that direct 
democracy allegedly brings about: Not only is quadrilingualism enshrined in the Swiss Federal 
                                                 
6
  Peter Krause, Verfassungsrechtliche Möglichkeiten unmittelbarer Demokratie § 35 N 48 in HANDBUCH DES 
STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND. BAND III (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 3rd ed. 2005) 
(translation by the author).  
7
  Hans Huber, Über den Initiativbetrieb und über Ausführungsgesetze zu Volksinitiativen 357 in 
STAATSORGANISATION UND STAATSFUNKTION IM WANDEL. FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KURT EICHENBERGER ZUM 60. 
GEBURTSTAG (Georg Müller, René A. Rhinow et al. eds., 1982) (translation by the author). 
8
  GIOVANNI SARTORI, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY REVISITED 115, 120 (1987). 
9
  THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 48 (James Madison) (R. Pole, 2005). 
10
  David Butler & Austin Ranney, Practice, in REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD. THE GROWING USE OF 
DIRECT DEMOCRACY 5 (1994). 
11
  Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft [SWISS FED. CONST.] April 18, 1999, SR 101, 
RO, 101, art. 190 (Switz.) 
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Constitution naming “German, French, Italian, and Romansh (…) national languages“12 but, as 
both Zurich and Geneva were cradles of the Roman Catholic Church’s reformation in the 16th 
century, both Protestants and Roman Catholics make up a significant proportion of the 
population.13 Apart from these traditional minorities, more than one in five of Switzerland’s 
inhabitants are non-Swiss citizens and as many as 24 percent of them are foreign-born, roughly 
the same percentage as in Australia, as a result of a considerably higher degree of immigration 
per capita in comparison with traditional immigration countries such as Australia, Canada or the 
United States14. If Switzerland, despite its strong commitment to direct democracy, in fact turns 
out to be a “paradigmatic case of political integration” as the late Karl W. Deutsch phrased it,15 
are all the perils associated with popular decision-making plainly false? Does Switzerland, thus, 
supply evidence that popular constitutionalism does not jeopardize the legitimate interests of 
minorities even without protection provided by courts? 
This paper aims at explaining this putative “Swiss puzzle” by demonstrating that 
Switzerland has, over time, adapted a form of direct democracy which provides for an interaction 
between the political elite and citizens. I therefore label the system of direct democracy at the 
federal level in Switzerland as an “interactional model of direct democracy” and highlight the 
importance of the interface between the institutions of direct and indirect democracy. I will argue 
that this interactional model provides a set of safeguards for the protection of (traditional) 
                                                 
12
  SWISS FED. CONST. art. 190. 
13
  CLAUDE BOVAY, RAPHAËL BROQUET, RELIGIONSLANDSCHAFT IN DER SCHWEIZ 11 (Federal Statistical 
Office ed., 2004) available at http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/01/22/publ.Document.50514.pdf 
(stating that in 2000 about 42 percent of Switzerland’s population were registered members of the Roman-Catholic 
and about 33 percent of the Established Evangelic-Protestant Churches). 
14
  ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: 
SWITZERLAND 118-9 (2007); ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL 
MIGRATION OUTLOOK ANNUAL REPORT 37, 50-1, 287-7 (2007) 
15
  KARL W. DEUTSCH, SCHWEIZ ALS EIN PARADIGMATISCHER FALL POLITISCHER INTEGRATION (1976). 
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minorities, at least for those who form part of the political system. The Swiss experience, 
however, does not provide support for those who would deny any demand for constitutional 
safeguards enforced by courts in a democracy as “discrete and insular minorities” are often 
located in the “blind spot” (see p. 26-30) of the instruments of direct democracy. It could, 
however, provide for means to cure what can be called the alleged “Californian disease”, that is 
the misuse of popular initiatives by special interests groups curbing the legitimate rights of 
minorities. 
My argument is structured in four steps: Section II (p. 5 sqq.) briefly outlines both the 
constitutional history and the foundations of Swiss Federal constitutional law. Section III 
(p. 13 sqq.) portrays the institutions of direct democracy at the federal level (mandatory 
referendum, optional referendum, popular initiative) and links the constitutional provisions with 
empirical finding in the field of political science and public choice theory. Section IV (p. 21 sqq.) 
focuses on the interface between direct and representative democracy and assesses the main 
allegations against direct democratic decision-making and the claims in favor of popular 
participation. The main findings are summarized in the concluding remarks (V; (p. 31 sqq.). 
II.  Nation Building in the 19th Century and its Legacy 
A.  A State but not a “Nation” 
Modern Switzerland emerged in 1848 after a short civil war (Sonderbundskrieg) – which 
lasted only three weeks and resulted in few casualties (140 dead and 400 wounded persons) – 
between the liberal16, mainly Protestant Cantons on the one side and conservative, predominantly 
Roman-Catholic Cantons tied together in a secret treaty (Sonderbund), on the other side. The 
                                                 
16
  In view of their political goals the “liberals” and the “radicals” (les radicaux) of Switzerland’s 19th century 
may rather be called “libertarian” in an American context. 
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decisive victory of the liberal Cantons in 1847 paved the way for a transformation into a federal 
state with the enactment of the first Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 
September 12, 1848. Thus, despite its official name as “Swiss Confederation”, Switzerland has 
been a federal state since 1848. The birth of the Swiss “nation”, however, is usually traced back 
as far as 1291. In that year the three communities Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden signed the 
“Federal Charter” agreeing upon mutual assistance. This pact, which was a common feature of 
the European Middle Ages, over time emerged into a network of mutual agreements between 
different entities.17 After France conquered Switzerland in 1798, a centralized state, the “Helvetic 
Republic”, was put into place by Napoleon but seized to exist as a central authority in 1803. At 
the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Switzerland agreed to reinstall the traditional loose 
confederation of sovereign states linked together by an assembly of representatives of the 
Cantons (the Diet), each having the right to veto. However, not only did the principle of equality 
of the Cantons introduced by Napoleon remain in place but many of the liberal ideas of the 
French Revolution sustained their influence within Switzerland. 
When Switzerland became a federal state in 1848, the new state lacked what constituted a 
“nation” according to the reigning paradigm of Europe’s 18th and 19th century: a common 
ethnicity as well as a common language. This holds true even today. Sixteen out of today’s 
twenty-six Cantons chose German, five French, and one (Ticino) Italian as their official 
language, three Cantons are bi-lingual (Berne, Fribourg, Valais), and one is tri-lingual (Grisons). 
In contrast, the long standing opposition between the Protestant and the Roman Catholic 
denomination rooted in the fiercely fought Kulturkampf of the second half of the 19th century – 
the struggle between political Roman Catholicism and anticlerical liberalism – eased 
                                                 
17
  See, e.g., ULRICH IM HOF, MYTHOS SCHWEIZ 29-33 (1991); see also BERNHARD STETTLER, BUNDESBRIEFE 
IN HISTORISCHES LEXIKON DER SCHWEIZ (2005), http://hls-dhs-dss.ch/index.php. 
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considerably during the 20th century. As of 2000, 63.7 percent of the inhabitants of Switzerland 
(7.5 millions in 2008) name German as their main language, 20.4 percent French, 6.5 percent 
Italian, 0.5 percent Rumatsch and 9.0 percent a language not having the status of a “national” 
language according to the Swiss Federal Constitution.18 Against this background of linguistic, 
denominational, as well as ethnic diversity, legends such as the founding saga of 1291 
romanticized by Friedrich Wilhelm von Schiller in his “William Tell” (1804) may be interpreted 
as the construction of a common identity for the perceived “nation of will” (Willensnation; nation 
de volonté)19. Political features, such as direct democracy, neutrality, and federalism, which 
differentiated Switzerland as an “imagined community”20 from surrounding nations, became 
cornerstones of a common identity and the claim of Switzerland being “a special case” 
(Sonderfall, cas particulier) depicting a Swiss version of (national) exceptionalism.  
“Exceptionalism” is commonly associated with the phrase “American Exceptionalism” coined by 
Alexis de Tocqueville alluding “to the spirit of religion and the spirit of liberty”.21 Swiss exceptionalism – 
                                                 
18
  GEORGES LÜDI, IWAR WERLEN, SPRACHENLANDSCHAFT DER SCHWEIZ 17 (Federal Statistical Office ed., 
2005) available at http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/01/22/publ.Document.52216.pdf. 
19
  See, e.g., OLIVER ZIMMER, A CONTESTED NATION. HISTORY, MEMORY AND NATIONALISM IN 
SWITZERLAND, 1761-1891 151-3, 203-7, 218 (2003). For a classical account see the seminal work by ERNEST RENAN, 
QU'EST-CE QU'UNE NATION ? (CONFERENCE FAITE EN SORBONNE, LE 11 MARS 1882) 9, 20 (1882) (on the notion of 
“the nation”). 
20
  BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES. REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF 
NATIONALISM 138-9 (rev. ed. 1991). – However, Anderson’s basis for his claim that Switzerland, as a society rather 
than a state, became a nation as late as 1891 is not only exceedingly narrow – as he refers to CHRISTOPHER HUGHES, 
SWITZERLAND (1974) only as ANDERSON, supra note 20, at 135/footnote 42 openly admits (“This [Hughes’s] … 
text… is the basis for the argument that follows.”) – but, as ZIMMER, supra note 19, at xiv, rightly points out, 
contrary to historical evidence. 
21
  ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 36-7 (Philips Bradley, ed., Henry Reeve trans., A.A. 
Knopf 1948) 
 The birth of American exceptionalism, according to the traditional narrative, traces back to John Winthrop, 
Governor of the Massachusetts Bay Company in the first part of the 17th century, who underscored in his sermon of 
1630 “A Model of Christian Charity” that “we [the Puritan colony of the Massachusetts Bay] must consider that we 
shall be as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us.” (John Winthrop, We Shall be as a City upon the 
Hill 65 in SPEECHES THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (Owen Collins, ed., 1999)). In doing so, Winthrop echoed a 
passage of the Sermon on the Mount as described by the Gospel of Matthew insisting on the exemplary role the 
young Christian community should display: “You are the light of the world. A city set on a mountain cannot be 
hidden.” (5 Matthew 14 (emphasis added)). 
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stemming from the myth that Switzerland was founded on a hill, the Rütli, in 1291 in a struggle for freedom 
and against foreign oppression22 – shares, to some degree even today, the two seemingly contradictory 
elements of the concept of exceptionalism, that is isolationism on the one hand and a mild sense of 
mission23 on the other hand. Even if the second characteristic is, if at all, pronounced in a much weaker 
fashion, it left traces in the Federal Constitution declaring the promotion of “human rights [and] 
democracy” to be official goals of Swiss foreign relations24 while neutrality has been interpreted in a strict, 
isolationistic manner over a long period of time. 
The first Swiss Federal Constitution of September 12, 1848 was completely revised 
through the adoption of a new constitution of May 29, 1874. The latter led to a higher degree of 
unification and the enactment of an (incomplete) bill of rights. Some provisions, such as the 
positive right to free, religiously neutral, primary education, the freedom to marry, and the right 
to a “decent funeral”, were meant to push back the Roman Catholic Church’s role in the Swiss 
society at the culmination of the Kulturkampf between 1871 and 1874. Hence, the new 
constitution was fiercely contested. Some conservative and Roman Catholic Cantons rejected it 
with majorities as high as 92.1 percent, while some liberal and predominantly Protestant ones 
approved it with margins up to 96.8 percent.25  
                                                 
22
  See, e.g., ZIMMER, supra note 19, at 200-8. 
23
  As Thomas Maissen, Säkularer Staat in konfessionalisiertem Land, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, July 5, 2008, at 
62 rightly points out the concept of the Swiss being “the chosen people” – chosen by history rather than by a 
denominational (that is Protestant or Catholic) God – is not connected with a “missionary claim” as “uniqueness may 
at best be preserved but never exported.” (Translation by the author). Yet, some counter-examples exist. The 
following hymn written by the influential polymath and Protestant minister Johann Kaspar Lavater (1741-1801) in 
1768 is set in a strikingly parallel ton compared to aforementioned sermon (supra, note 21): “Let us be a light on the 
earth, and an example of constant fidelity, free as we are, others will be, and will scrunch tyranny!” (cited according 
to IM HOF, supra note 17, at 269 (translation by the author)). During the outside menace of fascism the Swiss novelist 
Denis de Rougemont (1906-1985) defined the guardianship of the concept of federalism in which the “rights of the 
individual and the responsibility for the common good are mutually enriching” constituting a benchmark for Europe 
as a whole as the “necessary mission of Switzerland” (DENIS DE ROUGEMONT, MISSION OU DEMISSION DE LA SUISSE 
109-10 (1940) (footnote omitted)). 
24
  SWISS FED. CONST. art. 54, ¶ 2. 
25
  Federal Chancellery – Results of Popular Votes, http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/18740419/can12.html 
(the results of the Canton of Uri and Schaffhausen respectively are cited in the text above). 
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If “amendmentitis” is a constitutional disease,26 the Swiss Federal Constitution indeed 
suffered heavily from it. At the same time, the Federal Supreme Court expanded the bill of rights 
based on the concept of “unwritten fundamental rights”.27 The fragmentation of Swiss Federal 
constitutional law gave rise to a completely revised constitution adopted on April 19, 1999 that 
came into force on January 1st, 2000. After several failed attempts to revise the Constitution had 
failed since the 1960s, the concept of the revision of 1999 was relatively modest: Instead of major 
innovations, the authorities aimed at “updating the present written and unwritten constitutional 
law, to present it in a comprehensive manner, to structure it systematically, and to unify the 
language and the denseness.”28 
B.  Supremacy of Parliament and Partial Constitutional Review 
Despite its commitment to the Rechtsstaat, fundamental rights, democracy, social welfare, 
and free markets, the institutional design of the Swiss Federal Constitution of 1999 to some 
extend still breaths the spirit of the founding era of the 19th century. This is especially true for the 
separation of powers. Article 148 puts forward that “the Federal Parliament is” – “subject to the 
power of the People and the Cantons” – “the highest authority of the Confederation”.29 Article 
                                                 
26
  See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Amendmentitis, American Prospects, November 30, 2002, 
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=constitutional_amendmentitis (arguing that “we should keep in force a 
strong presumption against amending the Constitution.”). 
27
  See, e.g., Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Court] Oct. 27, 1995, 121 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen 
Bundesgerichts [BGE] I 367 at 370 para. 2a (summarizing the doctrine of “unwritten constitutional rights” according 
to which a alleged right must pass a two-prong test in order to qualify by proofing that it (1.) is a prerequisite for the 
enjoyment of other fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, or is an essential part of a constitutional order 
based on the principles of democracy and Rechtsstaat, and (2.) reflects either a constitutional reality in the Cantons 
or is supported by a broad consensus; the right to assembly, the right to property, personal liberty, and the positive 
right to aid in distress, inter alia, qualified under this doctrine.). 
28
  Bundesbeschluss über die Totalrevision der Bundesverfassung [Federal Decree on the Total Revision of the 
Federal Constitution] June 3,1987, BBl II 963-4 (1987) article 3 (stating the following in German: “Der Entwurf 
wird das geltende geschriebene und ungeschriebene Verfassungsrecht nachführen, es verständlich darstellen, 
systematisch ordnen sowie Dichte und Sprache vereinheitlichen.“). 
29
  SWISS FED. CONST. art. 148, ¶ 1. 
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148 is echoed by Article 190, which sets forth that “[t]he Federal Supreme Court and the other 
authorities applying the law [that is, all Federal and cantonal courts as well as administrative 
agencies] are obliged to apply the Federal statutes and treaties.”30 In other words, such sources of 
law have to be applied by the courts even if they violate the Federal Constitution.  
The reason for this solution is twofold: First, parliament is seen as the superior “voice of 
the people” as opposed relative to the other Federal authorities; secondly, the liberal-radical 
movement dominated Switzerland during the first decades after 1848 and a judicial control of 
liberal reforms would have been against the interest of the politically dominant force.31 Yet, the 
adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1974 changed this 
constitutional arrangement considerably.32 
C.  Federalism 
The need for what from an American perspective could be labeled “Reconstruction” after 
the Swiss civil war (Sonderbundskrieg) in 1847, resulted in a strong commitment to federalism. 
As a consequence the Confederation has to rely on a specific constitutional provision in order to 
enact laws in a certain area such as nuclear power33 or genetic engineering.34, 35 Such a 
                                                 
30
  SWISS FED. CONST. art. 190. 
31
  ALFRED KÖLZ, NEUERE SCHWEIZERISCHE VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE. IHRE GRUNDLINIEN IN BUND UND 
KANTONEN SEIT 1848 576 (2004). 
32
  According to Article 34 of the Charter, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg “may receive 
applications from any person (…) to be the victim of a violation (…) of the rights set forth in the Convention or the 
protocols thereto.” The European Charter, thus, does not take into account the differentiation set forth in Art. 190 of 
the Swiss Constitution. Moreover, in line with the system of monism, self-executing guarantees of treaties are 
directly applicable in Swiss courts and administrative agencies. As the European Court of Human Rights “may only 
deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted” (Article 35.1 ECHR), the Swiss Federal 
Supreme Court was confronted with the problem of how to deal with Federal statutes that violated the Convention. 
After a period of reluctance, it decided in 1991 to review such statutes in cases of controversies, as long as 
guarantees of the ECHR were allegedly violated. Therefore, in practical terms the scope of Article 190 has been 
reduced considerably. 
33
  See SWISS FED. CONST. art. 90 (stating that the regulation of nuclear energy is a federal matter). 
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constitutional amendment calls for a double majority by the People and the Cantons.36 The 
authority to allocate the powers within the federalist framework – the so-called “competence-
competence” – therefore lies with the People and the Cantons. In addition, the federal element is 
reflected in the bi-cameral structure of parliament, which at the time of its institution constituted 
a modification of the model set forth in the United States Constitution.37 Parliament – referred to 
as the Federal Assembly –consists of the National Council (200 representatives directly elected 
according to the system of proportional representation and each Canton forming an electoral 
district) and the Council of States (46 delegates of the Cantons, each of them represented by 
two38 members according to their own regulations which predominantly chose majority 
representation).39 Both chambers of the Federal Assembly have equal powers.40 With the 
exception of elections, petitions of pardon and jurisdictional disputes between the highest federal 
authorities which are decided by the Federal Assembly as a whole, decisions made by the 
parliament must be approved by both chambers.41  
Besides strong influences of the French Revolution and the Constitutions of the Cantons, 
the bi-cameral design of the legislative branch provides evidence that the United States 
Constitution served to some extent as a role model for the Swiss Federal Constitution. The 
American presidential system, however, was feared as an “approximation to monarchy or even 
                                                                                                                                                              
34
  See SWISS FED. CONST. art. 119, ¶ 2 (stating that the regulation of gene technology in the human field is a 
federal matter). 
35
  SWISS FED. CONST. art. 3; SWISS FED. CONST. art. 42, ¶ 1. 
36
  SWISS FED. CONST. art. 142, ¶ 2 and SWISS FED. CONST. art. 140 , ¶ 1 (a). 
37
  See ALFRED KÖLZ, NEUERE SCHWEIZERISCHE VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE. IHRE GRUNDLINIEN VOM ENDE 
DER EIDGENOSSENSCHAFT BIS 1848 563 (1992). 
38
  Cantons that emerged through a split of one Canton into two (Obwald, Nidwald, Basel City, Basel Land, 
Appenzell Outer Rhodes, Appenzell Inner Rhodes) each have only one instead of two seats in the Council of States. 
39
  SWISS FED. CONST. art. 149-50. 
40
  SWISS FED. CONST. art. 148, ¶ 2. 
41
  SWISS FED. CONST. art. 156, ¶ 2. 
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dictatorship” as Henri Druey, who became a member of the first Federal Council (executive 
branch) on November 16, 1848, put it in a debate of the Swiss counterpart to the 
U.S. Constitutional convention debating the design of the executive branch.42 Instead, the envoys 
relied on a model that had already been tested in several Cantons: The executive branch, named 
“Federal Council” consists of seven members, each of them having equal rights.43 To provide for 
the parliamentary supremacy44 outlined before, the Federal Assembly elects the Federal Council 
for a term of four years.45 Neither a recall nor a motion of no-confidence is permissible during 
these four years. One of the Federal Councilors is elected President of the Confederation chairing 
the Federal Council as a mere primus inter pares, not enjoying any special political privileges 
besides representative tasks for one non-renewable term of one year only.46 The Federal Council 
makes its decisions in sessions not open to the public as a collective body.47  
The chosen design of the Federal Council allows the adaption of modes of power-sharing 
as a specific form of consensus democracy in the executive branch: As an unwritten rule the 
Federal Council is traditionally composed of four members from a Swiss-German canton and 
three from a French (usually two or three) or Italian-speaking canton (usually none or one); well 
into the 20th century, the religious denomination of possible Federal Councils was a crucial 
factor, now slowly being displaced by gender-considerations. As a result of constitutional 
                                                 
42
  KÖLZ, supra note 37, at 570. 
43
  See SWISS FED. CONST. art. 177, ¶ 1. 
44
  For historical evidence for the relevance of this argument see KÖLZ, supra note 37, at 570 (referring to 
Henri Druey). 
45
  SWISS FED. CONST. art. 175, ¶ 2 and SWISS FED. CONST. art. 149, ¶ 2, second sentence. 
46
  SWISS FED. CONST. art. 176. 
47
  See SWISS FED. CONST. art. 177, ¶ 1. 
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factors48 and institutional factors49, the Federal Council – like executive bodies of other countries 
– holds de facto a strong position vis-à-vis the Federal Assembly, in particular due to its 
privileged access to specific information provided by the administration. Therefore, the Federal 
Council plays by far the most important role in the political decision-making process, as there is 
not a single point to completely bypass the Executive branch.50 
III.  Institutions of Direct Democracy 
A.  Frequency: “Voting as a Way of Life”51 
From the founding of modern Switzerland as a Federation in 1848 until the end of 
February 2008, 546 proposals underwent a nation-wide popular vote, 318 (or 58 percent) of them 
in the last three decades alone.52 As a result, Swiss citizens are called to the ballots to vote on a 
federal bill, a constitutional amendment or a treaty approximately every three to four months. 
Voter participation varies significantly. As a general trend, voter turnout declined sharply from 
about 60 percent after World War II to about 40 percent in the mid-seventies.53 The figures have, 
                                                 
48
  Such as fixed term, right to initiate laws in the Federal Assembly and to draft proposals, right of the Federal 
Councilors to take part in sessions of parliamentary committees and to speak in the Federal Assembly, Federal 
Councils being heads of the expanded Federal administration. 
49
  Namely, Federal Councilors as professionals as opposed to the members of the Federal Assembly each of 
them having a professional career besides their political mandate as well as direct democracy weakening the role of 
the Federal Assembly. 
50
  Ulrich Klöti, The Government 154 in HANDBOOK OF SWISS POLITICS (Ulrich Klöti et al, eds., 2nd ed., 2007). 
51
  This phrases is borrowed from the title of Voting as a way of life, The Economist, February 12, 2004 
(Survey: Switzerland), at 6. 
52
  Data according to the Federal Chancellery – Chronologie Volksabstimmungen, 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/ vab_2_2_4_1.html (as of February 28, 2008). 
53
  See Alexander H. Trechsel, Popular Votes 438 in HANDBOOK OF SWISS POLITICS (Ulrich Klöti et al. eds., 
2nd ed. 2007). 
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however, risen in recent years. Deciding majorities in popular votes make up approximately 10 to 
20 percent of the population.54 
B.  Mandatory Referendum 
Amendments to the Federal Constitution initiated by the federal authorities must undergo 
a mandatory referendum.55 Consequently, every extension of the powers of the Confederation is 
subject to such a vote (see p. 10). Moreover, an entry into organizations for collective security 
(such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO) or into supranational organizations 
(such as the European Community as the supranational core of the European Union) as well as 
Federal statutes declared urgent and, at the same time, lacking a constitutional basis, must 
undergo a mandatory referendum.56 The mandatory referendum requires a double majority: the 
majority of those voting and the majority of the Cantons.57 The bill is defeated in case of a split. 
The vote of a Canton is determined by the result of the popular vote in the respective Canton.58 
Six Cantons have each half a cantonal vote only for historical reasons.59 Thus, a mandatory 
referendum is approved as long as it reaches both a majority of those voting and at least 12 votes 
of the Cantons. Between 1848 and 2005 205 mandatory referenda took place. 152 of them were 
adopted, 53 were rejected; 8 times a referendum reached popular but not the cantonal support 
required by the Federal Constitution.60  
                                                 
54
  WOLF LINDER, SWISS DEMOCRACY: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO CONFLICT IN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES 91-3 
(2nd ed., 1998). 
55
  SWISS FED. CONST. art. 140 , ¶ 1 (a). 
56
  SWISS FED. CONST. art. 140 , ¶ 1. 
57
  SWISS FED. CONST. art. 142, ¶ 2 and SWISS FED. CONST. art. 140 , ¶ 1 (a). 
58
  SWISS FED. CONST. art. 142, ¶ 3. 
59
  See SWISS FED. art. 142 , ¶ 4. 
60
  Wolf Linder, Direct Democarcy, in HANDBOOK OF SWISS POLITICS 111 (2nd ed., Ulrich Klöti et al., eds., 
2007). 
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The requirement of a double majority significantly increases the weight of the small 
Cantons given the vast differences in the size of their population. Throughout history, however, 
the double-majority clause was a concession towards the defeated Cantons of the civil war during 
“the Swiss Reconstruction” (see p. 5&10) aiming at protecting the small, rural and traditionally 
Roman-Catholic and German speaking Cantons of central Switzerland. The losers of the double 
majority clause are the linguistic minorities and Cantons with large cities (Cantons Zurich, 
Geneva, Basel-City, and Berne).61 Most of the mandatory referenda dealt with the extension of 
the powers of the Confederation. Therefore, the mandatory referendum is a bulwark of federalism 
against a trend towards centralizing power within the Swiss Federal Constitution. 
C.  Optional Referendum 
Federal statutes, and those declared urgent with a validity exceeding one year, Federal 
decrees to the extent the Constitution or the statute foresee this, international treaties provided 
that (a) they are of unlimited duration and may not be terminated, or (b) provide for the entry into 
an international organization, or (c) involve a multilateral unification of law, may be put to a 
popular vote provided that 50,000 citizens entitled to vote or 8 Cantons ask for a optional 
referendum within 100 days after the official publication of the bill (see also p. 21).62 The 
requirement of 50,000 signatures equals currently about 1 percent of all the citizens entitled to 
vote. These levels were met 163 times between 1874 and May 2008.63 In the same period only 
7 percent of the bills potentially qualifying for an optional referendum were actually put to a 
                                                 
61
  Adrian Vatter, Fritz Sager, Föderalismus am Beispiel des Ständemehrs, 2 Swiss Pol. Sci. Rev. 1, 13-4 
(1996). 
62
  SWISS FED. CONST. art. 141, ¶ 1. 
63
  See Federal Chancellery – Referenden, Übersicht in Zahlen, 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/rf/ref_2_2_3_4.html. 
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popular vote based on the request of 50,000 citizens.64 The seminal work by Leonard Neidhart in 
1970 on the “representative alteration of the referendum”, however, provided evidence of the 
strong preemptive moderation-effect that the mere possibility to put a bill to a popular vote gives 
rise to.65 The figures of the period from 1874 to 2008 indicate that a bill which must undergo a 
popular vote due to a popular referendum fails to gain popular support in more than 45 percent of 
the cases.66 Conversely, there is a positive casual relationship between the degree of consensus in 
the Federal Assembly and the likelihood that a bill will be approved by the voters.67 This 
interrelation exerted a strong influence and transformed the Swiss political system into an 
arrangement of power sharing called consensus- or “concordance democracy.” As opposed to the 
Netherlands, the Swiss model of “consociationalism” (Arend Lijphart68) does not stem from a 
mutual agreement by the leading parties but from the “coercive pressure to cooperate”69 set in 
place by the optional referendum. As the fiercely disputed Federal Constitution of 1874 (see p. 8) 
indicates, Switzerland was not born as a consensus democracy as conflicts were prevalent from 
the outset but shaped in such a way over the years by, among other things, the different direct 
democratic institutions. 
                                                 
64
  Calculation by the author based upon the data according to Linder, supra note 60. 
65
  LEONARD NEIDHART, PLEBISZIT UND PLURALITÄRE DEMOKRATIE 287, 313 (1970). For an assessment see 
e.g. HANSPETER KRIESI, LE SYSTÈME POLITIQUE SUISSE 99 (1998). For empirical evidence see e.g. Adrian Vatter, 
Consensus and Direct Democracy. Conceptual and Empirical Linkages, 38 Europ. J. of Pol. Res. 171, 185 (2000). 
66
  See Linder, supra note 60. 
67
  See Pascal Sciarini, The Decision Making-Process 487 in HANDBOOK OF SWISS POLITICS 111 (2nd ed., 
Ulrich Klöti et al., eds., 2007). 
68
  See AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES (1977); Democracies. Patterns of Majoritarian 
and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (1984); Democratic Political Systems, Types, Cases, Causes, 
and Consequences, 1 J. of Theoretical Pol. 33 (1989); Democracies: Forms, Performance, and Constitutional 
Engineering, 25 Europ. J. of Pol. Res. 1 (1994); Reflections: Dimensions of Democracy, 31 Europ. J. of Pol. Res. 195 
(1997); THINKING ABOUT DEMOCRACY. POWER SHARING AND MAJORITY RULE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2007). 
69
  LINDER, supra note 54, at 119 (emphasis added). 
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According to public choice theory, every party represented in a parliament strives to push 
through as much of its own partisan agenda as it possibly can. This leads to a so-called “minimal 
winning coalition”, that is the smallest possible coalition of parties necessary to push through a 
proposal. Rational actors facing the possibility of an optional referendum have to balance such a 
strategy against the possibility of a “popular veto”.70 The optional referendum, therefore, leads to 
a broader coalition of parties compared to purely parliamentarian democracies. As not only 
political parties but also interest groups, such as unions, employers’ associations, or NGOs may 
have the resources necessary to collect 50,000 signatures within the time-frame set forth by the 
Constitution, their interests will indirectly influence parliamentarian decision-making. This is 
why in 1947 the “procedure of consultation” was instituted. Important legislation, international 
treaties and other “projects of substantial impact” are subject to “consultation” among the 
“Cantons, the political parties, and the interested circles”71  
As not only most of the legislations are initiated by the executive branch (Federal 
Council) but as the optional referendum provides incentives to consider the interests of the 
relevant groups in an early stage of the decision-making process, the “popular veto” also shapes 
the partisan composition of the Federal Council. The Catholic conservative minority used the 
optional referendum “like a machine gun to shoot down important projects”72 of the liberal 
majority in the 19th century. These “windstorms of referenda” in the 1880s only came to an end 
when the first member of the Catholic Conservative Party was elected Federal Councilor in 
                                                 
70
  See WOLF LINDER, SCHWEIZERISCHE DEMOKRATIE: INSTITUTIONEN, PROZESSE, PERSPEKTIVEN 256-64 (2nd 
edition, 2005) (discussing the possible trade-offs). 
71
  SWISS FED. CONST. art. 147. 
72
  LINDER, supra note 54, at 118. 
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1891.73 The same scheme was applied in 1928 in order to integrate the party of farmers and 
craftsmen into the executive branch, and again in 1943 in regard to the Social Democratic Party.  
The system of concordance paved the way from coexistence to pluralism by successfully 
integrating the linguistic, denominational and socio-economic minorities into the political 
system.74 This came at the price, however, of reduced transparency and political accountability 
through elections. The optional referendum and the principle of proportional representation in the 
National Council installed in 1919 played a crucial role in that process. This shift towards 
pluralism was at least enhanced by the absence of clear-cut socio-economic, denominational and 
linguistic cleavages. Both denominational groups, for example, can be found among French and 
German speakers and the socio-economic boundaries do not follow the linguistic or 
denominational cleavages. 
D.  Popular Initiative 
The institution of the “popular initiative” gives 100,000 citizens entitled to vote (currently 
2 percent of all the voters) the right to propose a revision of the Federal Constitution.75 The 
popular initiative was established as an amendment to the Constitution in 1891. In contrast to the 
Cantons, where popular initiatives may be used in order to change statutes, only the Federal 
Constitution can be object of a popular initiative. It can aim at either a complete or at a partial 
revision of the Federal Constitution. The latter may be proposed as a general suggestion requiring 
the Federal Assembly to formulate the definite draft for an amendment or as a formulated draft. A 
                                                 
73
  But see Christian Bolliger, Regula Zürcher, Deblockierung durch Kooptation? Eine Fallstudie zur 
Aufnahme der Katholisch-Konservativen in die schweizerische Landesregierung 1891, 10 Swiss Pol. Sci. Rev. 59, 
85-8 (2004) (providing evidence that the end of the “windstorms of the referenda“ was rather the cause not the result 
of the election of a Catholic Conservative into the Federal Council). 
74
  The argument in this paragraph stems from LINDER, supra note 54, at 18-27. 
75
  SWISS FED. CONST. art. 139. 
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formulated draft, provided it is valid, may not be changed by the Federal authorities. Close to 
90 percent of all the initiatives successfully launched since 1892 were formulated drafts. When a 
popular initiative aims at changing the Constitution, a double majority of the people and the 
Cantons is required (see p. 14).76 This turned out to be a high threshold: Only 15 (or 9.3 percent) 
out of 162 initiatives have been approved from 1892 to May 2008.77 Yet, the barriers of entry to 
the political arena remain low (draft supported by 2 percent of the voters within 18 months), 
while the hurdles to reach ultimate success remain difficult to cross. A popular initiative deemed 
to have success in the voting process, however, often triggers a bargaining process. 
Consequently, although complete success is rare, data provides evidence that approximately a 
third of all the popular initiatives nevertheless exhibit a considerable impact on Federal 
legislation.78 
This indirect effect is due to the interaction which takes place at the different stages a 
popular initiative must pass according to the Swiss Federal Constitution. The first of these three 
stages takes place outside the system of representative democracy: The “initiative committee” 
launching the proposal aims at collecting the required 100,000 signatures within 18 months.79 
After the Federal Chancellery’s approval that the formal requirements of the initiative are met, 
the procedure moves to the second stage: The popular initiative is absorbed by the system of 
representative democracy. Both the Federal Council as well as the chambers of the Federal 
Assembly may initiate counter-proposals embracing some of the concerns set forth in the popular 
initiative, either at the level of the Constitution or the Federal statutes. This may provide 
                                                 
76
  SWISS FED. CONST. art. 142, ¶ 2 and SWISS FED. CONST. art. 139 , ¶ 3. 
77
  See Federal Chancellery – Volksabstimmungen, abgestimmte Volksinitiativen, 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d//pore/vi/vis_2_2_5_7.html. 
78
  See Dominique Joyce, Yannis Papadopoulos, Votations moteur. Les logiques de vote blanc et de la 
participation 260, in ELITES POLITIQUES ET PEUPLE EN SUISSE (Yannis Papadopoulos, ed. 1994). 
79
  See SWISS FED. CONST. art. 139, ¶ 1. 
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incentives for the initiative committee to withdraw the initiative in order to avoid a costly and 
unpredictable voting campaign. The amount of popular initiatives withdrawn, however, sharply 
declined from about 50 percent to slightly more than 25 percent since the 1970s.80 Based on a 
detailed report by the Federal Council, the Federal Assembly not only recommends the popular 
initiative to be approved or rejected, but determines whether the proposal complies with the 
requirements of Article 139 § 2 of the Constitution.81 A popular initiative as a formulated draft 
must “respect the principle of unity of form, the principle of unity of subject matter” and 
“peremptory norms of international law”82. The Federal Assembly “shall declare the initiative 
invalid, in whole or in part” if one of these requirements is not complied with.  
The popular initiative is used by various groups, ranging from the established parties from 
the left and the right represented in the Federal Assembly, to labor unions, national-conservative 
anti-immigration movements, and environmental groups. The popular initiative breaks up the 
monopoly over the political agenda and, as the Swiss political scientist and lawyer Wolf Linder 
put it, “enlarges the realm of the politically thinkable and feasible… .”83 In contrast to the 
mandatory and the optional referenda, the popular initiative’s starting point lies outside the 
boundaries of the system of representative politics.  
Topics brought forward through initiatives are thus unmitigated by the channels of 
executive and legislative decision-making. The popular initiative has, consequently, not only 
                                                 
80
  Yannis Papadopoulos, How Does Direct Democracy Matter? The Impact of Referendum Votes on Politics 
and Policy-Making, 24 West Europ. Pol. 35, 49 f. (2001). 
81
  SWISS FED. CONST. art. 139, ¶ 2. – For an extensive analysis see Johannes Reich, Direkte Demokratie und 
völkerrechtliche Verpflichtungen im Konflikt. Funktionellrechtlich differenzierte Herstellung praktischer 
Konkordanz zwischen der Beachtung des Völkerrechts und konfligierenden Volksinitiativen im schweizerischen 
Bundesverfassungsrecht, 68 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht [Heidelberg Journal of 
International Law] (2008) (forthcoming). 
82
  Ibid.  
83
  Wolf Linder, Direct Democarcy, in HANDBOOK OF SWISS POLITICS 117 (2nd ed., Ulrich Klöti et al., eds., 
2007). 
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been used for progressive change such as proportional representation or the protection of the 
natural environment but also for proposals deliberately targeting certain groups of society. The 
very first successful popular initiative was launched in 1892 to prohibit kosher butchering 
(shehitah). Behind the official promotion of animal welfare lurked the ugly grimace of anti-
Semitism. Both of them joined together in a flimsy victory on August 20, 1893.84 
IV.  Interplay between Direct and Representative Democracy 
A.  Selection and Control of Government Policies 
The political system at the federal level of Switzerland is generally classified as being 
“semi-direct democratic”85 pointing to the fact that not each and every proposal may or must 
undergo a popular vote. Rather, the Federal Constitution allows for a system of selection86: the 
most important decisions (amendments to the Constitution; treaties to join supranational 
organizations or organizations for collective self-defense) are taken by the People and the 
Cantons in a popular vote87, while important decisions (especially Federal statutes and certain 
international treaties) are primarily decided by the Federal Assembly but undergo a popular vote 
by the people when 50,000 citizens demand it,88 and less important decisions (simple federal 
decrees; ordinances) are taken by the Federal Council or the Federal Assembly alone.89As 
opposed to the concept of plebiscites initiated by governments in order to gain support for their 
                                                 
84
  Due to the requirement of a double majority, as few as 63 individual votes in the small Canton of 
Nidwalden could have provided for a reverse outcome. See BBl IV 401 (1893). 
85
  Linder, supra note 60, at 108. 
86
  See LINDER, supra note 70, at 243 (describing semi-direct democracy as “a selecting system”). 
87
  SWISS FED. CONST. art. 141. See Kernenergiegesetz [KEG] [Federal statute on Nuclear Energy] March 21, 
2003, SR 732.1, art. 48, ¶ 4 (Switz.) (allowing for an optional referendum against the construction permit for a 
nuclear power). 
88
  SWISS FED. CONST. art. 140. 
89
  SWISS FED. CONST. art. 163, ¶ 1 & 2; SWISS FED. CONST. art. 182, ¶ 1. 
Working Paper   An Interactional Model of Direct Democracy 
 
 22 
policy as incorporated, e.g., in the French90 and the Austrian91 constitutions, it is not within the 
discretion of the Federal Council or the Parliament whether or not to put a certain act to a popular 
vote. As a consequence, instruments of direct democracy in the Swiss context are means to 
control and to oppose the policies set forth by the political branches of government. 
B.  Responsiveness and Deliberation 
Institutions of direct democracy are often a mere complement to representative 
democracy. This holds true as well for most of the states of the United States. Article II Section 8 
of the Constitution of the State of California92, for example, does not provide for channeling 
popular initiatives through the institutions of representative democracy in order to allow for 
deliberation. Consequently, “’Californian style’ direct democracy” is held to be dominated by 
mere “no-talk-just-vote drive-through referenda“93 Although even in such a dualistic system 
politicians have incentives to adapt and preempt both popular initiatives and referenda94, 
empirical data on individual decision-making in a direct democratic vote in the context of 
Switzerland provides evidence for the crucial importance of the interface between direct and 
representative democracy. A study conducted by Hanspeter Kriesi95 on the basis of an integrated 
                                                 
90
  See (1958) CONST. art. 11 § 1 (France) (according to which “[t]he President of the Republic may put any bill 
… to a referendum…”; “[l]e Président de la République … peut soumettre au référendum tout projet de loi ….”). 
91
  See Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [B-VG] [Constitution]BGBl. No. 1/BGBl. Nr. 1/1930, as last amended by 
Bundesgesetz [BG] BGBl. I No. 100/2003, art. 44, ¶ 3 (Austria) (according to which each partial or complete reviosn 
of the Federal Constitution shall put to a referendum by the people provided that a third of either the National - or the 
Federal Council asks for it). 
92
  C.A. Const. art. II, § 8. 
93
  AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION. A BIOGRAPHY 309 (2006). 
94
  See Elisabeth R. Gerber, Pressuring Legislature through the Use of Initiatives: Two Forms of Indirect 
Influence 191 in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS (Shaun Bowler et al., 1998)  
95
  The following text within this paragraph builds on the insights provided by HANSPETER KRIESI, DIRECT 
DEMOCRATIC CHOICE: THE SWISS EXPERIENCE (2005) and Hanspeter Kriesi, Argument-Based Strategies in Direct-
Democratic Votes: The Swiss Experience, 40 Acta Politica, 299, 313-4 (2005) as well as the two case-studies 
outlined by Hanspeter Kriesi, Individual Opinion Formation in a Direct Democratic Campaign, 32 Brit. J. of Pol. Sc. 
171, 184-5 (2002). 
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level dataset stemming from 47 surveys of popular votes at the federal level highlights the effects 
on the individual decision-making process underscores that voters are not left to apply systematic 
strategies (that is, individual information gathering through mass media and other relevant 
sources) at all times. As the data interpreted in the light of the groundbreaking insights provided 
by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman96, voters may adopt four types of shortcuts in order to 
make their decision in a sound and efficient way: First, they may prefer the status quo (status quo 
heuristic), secondly, they may vote according to the recommendation by the Federal Government 
and the Federal Assembly (trust heuristic), they, thirdly, may rely on the position of their party or 
interest group (partisan heuristic) or, as a fourth strategy, they may not vote at all (abstain). The 
actors influencing the individual decision making process, namely the parties, interest groups, the 
media, the Federal Council, members of the Federal Assembly – in short: the political elite – bear 
a considerable responsibility for both the legitimacy and the integrity of the direct-democratic 
process and its outcome. Intensive campaigns over fiercely disputed issues increase not only the 
relevance of partisan heuristic but the decisiveness of systematic strategies. Trust heuristics, on 
the other hand, play a pivotal role in undisputed votes. Voters with strong opinions tend to apply 
systematic strategies whereas those with weaker opinions often rely on heuristics. Therefore, 
voters mainly decide on the basis of elite-supplied arguments and heuristic cues. Both systematic 
voting and heuristics are significantly enhanced by the clear-cut structure of the voting process in 
the Swiss context, namely by the temporal binary party-coalition, respectively the 
government/opposition coalition temporally put in place. 
The main lesson to be learned from the Swiss experience is that a constitution enacting 
elements of direct democracy should provide for a clearly structured process, in which the 
                                                 
96
  See Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 
1124 (1974). 
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entities of representative democracy are connected with the direct-democratic institutions. In 
other words, an interactional model of direct democracy, as I call it, is crucial for the quality and 
for the integrity of the process of public deliberation and, as a consequence, for the legitimacy of 
the outcome of the democratic process. The seemingly small difference whether instruments such 
as the popular initiative are partly channeled through the executive and the legislative branch may 
decide whether direct democracy is limited to mere „no-talk-just-vote drive-through referenda“97 
or enables voters to make an informed decision based on a public deliberation by the public 
elites. At the same time, this conclusion points at the fact that direct democracy should not be 
mistaken for pure “governance by the people.” Political elites play a pivotal role even in a system 
of semi-direct democracy. Their behavior, however, is subject to a wide array of controlling 
instruments apart from regular votes and, as a result, tends to be more closely tied to the voters’ 
preferences. 
C.  Inclusion and its Limits 
According to Robert Dahl’s normative theory of democracy identifying equality as the 
core justification of democracy, modern democracies should provide for a high degree of 
inclusion.98 In other words, democratic states should, idealiter, grant political rights to all of the 
inhabitants affected by the outcome of the political process. Measured against this benchmark, 
Switzerland’s system of direct democracy exhibits a record hardly being exemplary. Women’s 
suffrage was introduced at the federal level as late as 1971. The small Canton Appenzell Inner 
Rhodes granted its female citizens the right to vote, only after a ruling by the Federal Supreme 
                                                 
97
  Supra note 93. 
98
  ROBERT DAHL, POLYARCHY. PARTICPIPATION AND OPPOSITION 202-7 (1971). See also ROBERT DAHL, 
DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 233 (1989) and ROBERT DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY (1998). 
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Court on November 27, 1990.99 At present “[a]ll Swiss citizens who are 18 years or older, and are 
not under guardianship because of mental illness or weakness, shall have political rights in 
federal matters.”100 Migration poses new challenges to the legitimacy of the process of direct 
democracy as 22 percent of the inhabitants of Switzerland are non-Swiss citizens not being 
entitled to political rights at least at the federal level. Only the Cantons Neuchâtel (since the 19th 
century) and Jura grant non-Swiss citizens, depending on the number of years of residence, the 
right to vote and the eligibility for office at the Cantonal level. 
This relatively low level of inclusion may partly be explained on the basis of the 
incentive-structure provided by institutions of direct democracy101: The introduction of women’s 
suffrage at the federal level asked for a constitutional amendment and, consequently, for an 
approval by a majority by both the (male) citizens eligible to vote and the Cantons. Under the 
assumption that politicians and parties act according to the economic model of human behavior 
and, therefore, “formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to 
formulate policies” as Anthony Downs102 stated, they face an inherent incentive to broaden their 
electoral basis and are able to formulate their programmatic goals in a way that appeals to men 
and women alike. Whereas a representative system offers this option of bargaining, the same 
problem amounts to a zero-sum-game in a direct democracy: The increase of influence of one 
player (in this case: the female citizens) is mirrored by the same decrease of political power of 
another player (the male citizens). This suggests that progressive change resulting in a 
considerable shift in political power might face additional obstacles in a system of direct 
                                                 
99
  See Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Court] Nov. 27, 1990, 116 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen 
Bundesgerichts [BGE] Ia 359. 
100
  SWISS FED. CONST. art. 136, ¶ 1. 
101
  See LINDER, supra note 70, at 62. 
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  ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 28 (1957). 
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democracy. Yet, given the rather progressive outcome of popular votes in sensitive issues such as 
abortion, drug policy, stem-cell research and gay rights, it can, in comparison with parliamentary 
European states, hardly be argued that direct democracy is reluctant to social change as such. 
D.  The Blind-spot of Direct Democracy 
As recently as in the year 2000, Swiss voters have been called upon to vote on such 
controversial issues as a liberalization of the norms set forth in the criminal penal code on 
abortion, Switzerland’s accession to the United Nations, “registered partnership for same-sex 
couples” (civil unions), life sentences for “highly dangerous” and “untreatable” sexual or violent 
offenders, a limited moratorium of genetically modified organism in agriculture, the financial 
support of countries of Eastern Europe having joined the European Union on January 1st, 2004 
(amounting to financial aid of one billion Swiss Francs to be spent within ten years), a 
constitutional obligation to enter into negations to join the European Union, or a provision to cap 
the share of non-Swiss citizens in relation to the inhabitants of Switzerland at 18 percent.103 
While the last two proposals where dismissed, the others were approved. Against this backdrop, it 
is difficult to establish a clear pattern on the outcome of direct popular participation as far as the 
legitimate interests of minorities – the alleged “tyranny of the majority” – are concerned. An 
actual “tyranny” of the majority properly called so – as opposed to mere disagreement both 
common and necessary to any intersubjective mode of decision-making – can only be claimed 
“when the rights or interests of the minority are wrongly subordinated to those of the majority”, 
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  For an overview of all the popular votes since 1848 at the federal level see Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei – 
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that is the decision made was not only “wrong and tyrannical in its implications for the rights of 
those affected” but the membership of the decisional and “topical majority” overlap.104  
Systematic empirical studies reached contradictory conclusions on the issue. Bruno S. 
Frey and Lorenz Goette, drawing on a dataset from voting results in Switzerland at the national, 
at Cantonal and at communal level (City of Zurich), found “that there is no inherent tendency in 
popular votes to suppress civil rights” and went on adding that “[f]or Switzerland, we find no 
evidence of voters overly disapproving civil rights issues.”105 The two authors, thus, re-
emphasize the conclusion one of the authors reached in 1994, stating that “[t]he widely held 
Madisonian fear of ‘irresponsible voters’ and ‘excesses of the majority’ has no empirical basis in 
a well-chosen constitutional framework.”106 Conversely, Donald P. Haider-Markel, Alana 
Querze and Kara Lindaman pointed out, based on data of 143 local and state gay civil rights 
initiatives and referenda held in the United States between 1971 and 2005, that the “evidence 
clearly suggests that the homosexual minority tends to lose when the voters decide”, whereas 
“minority rights do in fact fare better in representative democracy, especially when policy 
proposals are intended to limit the rights of the gay and lesbian minority.”107 Yet, the very case of 
gay and lesbian rights casts doubt on the assumption that the procedure of democratic decision-
making as such detached from socio-economic, religious, or cultural factors brings about better or 
worse protection of minority rights. On June 18, 2004 the Federal Assembly adopted a Federal 
statute that provided same-sex couples joined together in so-called “registered partnerships” (civil 
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unions) the very same rights as married heterosexual couples in terms of, inter alia, inheritance 
and social security law, with the exception that the former are not allowed to adopt children.108 A 
conservative committee collected 50,000 signatures for an optional referendum by October 7, 
2004. On June 5, 2005 58 percent of the voters approved the bill, 42 percent opposed it (voter 
turnout: 56,58 percent). The degree of approval within the Cantons varied within a range of 41,6 
to 68,6 percent.109 In contrast, the above mentioned popular initiative asking for life-long 
imprisonment for “highly dangerous” and “untreatable” sexual or violent offenders was approved 
by the Cantons and the people although a clear majority of the Federal Assembly opposed the 
initiative.110 The intensity of the campaign by both the opposing parties and the Federal Council 
remained remarkably low.111 This suggests – as the rational actor model of public choice theory 
predicts – that it may not be promising for politicians and parties to support the interests of 
certain minorities. This is a problem shared by the democratic process as such. The United States 
Supreme Court famously coined the notion of “discrete and insular minorities” for groups 
neglected by the political process.112 
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Yet, the factors determining whether or not the political process is – as the famous 
“footnote 4” suggests – “to be relied upon to protect minorities”, are distinctive in the Swiss 
context, as they are shaped, inter alia, by constitutional and socio-economic factors. As far as the 
latter are concerned part of the “Swiss puzzle” (see p. 2) is explained by the fact that social 
cleavages rarely run congruently within Switzerland (see p. 18). These cross-cutting cleavages 
within the Swiss society are most likely to forestall a constant discrimination of those minority 
groups with a considerable weight in the political process derived either from federalism or the 
number of voters.113 Additionally, the institutions of federalism tend to overrepresented 
traditional minorities living relatively concentrated in certain geographical areas (see p. 15). This 
helps to explain why both Roman-Catholics and linguistic minorities are or became over time 
part of the power-sharing model of Switzerland. Federalism as “a frozen instrument of minority 
protection”, however, fails to protect new minorities. Yet, with regard to such groups, as, e.g., the 
blue collar workers as a “by-product” of the Industrial Revolution, the distinctive mechanism 
might provide for protection through the political process. Both the mandatory and the optional 
referendum affect proposals which originate inside the institutions of representative democracy. 
The preemptive moderating effect of the referendum described above (p. 16) tends to mitigate 
such proposals significantly. The procedure of consultation provides affected groups the 
opportunity to raise their objections even before a proposal reaches the stage of parliamentarian 
discussion. It is, therefore, unlikely that a bill that is subject to a referendum overtly infringes the 
legitimate interests protected by fundamental rights as long as these interests are shared by well-
organized and assertive groups.  
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In sum, the influence and the protection provided by the political system is closely tied to 
two factors: First to federalism as a “frozen instrument” inherently favoring traditional and 
geographically concentrated minorities and, secondly, and even more decisively, political rights. 
Against this backdrop, non-traditional Swiss minorities, such as the Muslim population, put the 
Swiss system channeling minority protection at the federal level by and large through the 
political process to new tests it is unlikely to pass smoothly. These new challenges might be 
illustrated by the Muslim community in Switzerland. Although Muslims accounted for 4.26 
percent of the population of Switzerland in the year 2000, only 12 percent are Swiss citizens and 
therefore are entitled to have political rights.114 The Muslim community, as a consequence, is far 
from enjoying the same degree of political protection as traditional minorities. “Discrete and 
insular minorities”, therefore, constitute the blind spot of the direct democracy in general and the 
referenda in particular. This underscores that popular participation in decision-making cannot 
fully substitute for some level of constitutional review.115 
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V. Concluding Remarks: Lessons from the Swiss Experience 
Social science has taken a growing interest in analyzing direct democracy. Recent studies 
concluded, inter alia, that direct democracy leads to a more efficient administration, a lower tax 
level, and lesser tax evasion due to mutual trust.116 Some authors even claim that direct 
democracy results in a higher degree of happiness.117 This paper shed light on the three 
institutional pillars of the Swiss arrangement of direct democracy: the mandatory referendum, the 
optional referendum, and the popular initiative and their legal implications namely regarding 
minority protection. The preemptive moderating effect of the referendum transformed 
Switzerland from a majoritarian democracy in the 19th century to a political system based on 
negotiation, power-sharing, and consensus thereafter. Thus, a properly designed constitutional 
arrangement of direct democracy not merely complements representative democracy but leads to 
a close interaction between representative and direct democracy. Such an interactional model of 
direct democracy enhances deliberation on political issues as it allows the individual voter to 
adjust his/her decision based on certain short-cuts due to the recommendations by the authorities 
or the temporary party-coalitions formed due to the regular votes on referenda and initiatives. 
Due to the strong incentives for consensual decision-making provided by the institutions of direct 
democracy the interests of minorities are in general given considerable weight even though the 
Swiss system does provide for only limited constitutional review. That is why the so-called 
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“discrete and insular minorities” such as non-traditional minorities constitute the blind spot of the 
interactional model of direct democracy set in place by the Swiss Federal Constitution. This 
finding is further heighted by the fact that direct democracy provides only limited incentives for a 
high level of inclusion, as the case of female suffrage illustrates. An interactional model of direct 
democracy, therefore, mitigates a wide array of diverting claims, yet, it does not fully substitute 
for some level of constitutional review. 
* * * 
